To give or to grab : the principle of full, crippled and split conferral of powers Post-Lisbon by Govaere, Inge
 1  Article 5 TEU (Lisbon) stipulates as follows:  ‘ 1. The limits of Union competences are governed by 
the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. 2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States ’ . 
Note that the text of the Lisbon Treaty is much more substantial than the prior formulation in the Nice 
Treaty and at that time inserted only in the EC Treaty pillar: Art 5 TEC (Nice):  ‘ The Community shall 
act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to 
it therein ’ . 
 2  On discussions and attempt pre-Lisbon, see, eg,  G  De B ú rca ,  ‘ Limiting EU Powers ’ ( 2005 ) 
 1  European Constitutional Law Review  92 . 
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 I. Introduction 
 The principle of conferral of powers occupies a prominent place in the Lisbon 
Treaty. Not only is it stated as a fundamental and horizontal principle in the 
common provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (Article 5 TEU). 1 For 
the fi rst time utmost care has been given to lay down, in a Treaty text, also the 
modalities and the consequences of the application of this principle. 2 As such, 
a catalogue of competence is introduced in Articles 2 to 6 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which lists the  ‘ categories and areas 
of union competence ’ (Title I TFEU) whilst spelling out the nature of the com-
petences conferred to the Union in those fi elds, for instance, exclusive, shared or 
complementary. Moreover, it is recurrently and fi rmly stated that powers which 
are not conferred to the Union by the Treaties are to remain with the Member 
States (including Articles 4(1) and 5(2) TEU). Especially those new additions in 
the Treaties are revealing of the currently prevailing political context whereby the 
Member States seek to get a renewed grasp on the formulation, interpretation and 
application of the Treaty principle of conferral. This can hardly be  considered 
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 3  Marise Cremona points to the following two dimensions for allocation of competence: the 
relationship between the EU – Member States and the relationship between internal and external 
 powers, see  M  Cremona ,  ‘ EU External Relations :  Unity and Conferral of Powers ’ in  L  Azoulai (ed),  The 
Question of Competence in the European Union ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2014 )  65 . 
 4  Article 47 TEU reads:  ‘ The Union shall have legal personality ’ . 
 5  Article 19 TEU in conjunction with Art 344 TFEU. 
 6  Article 24 TEU. 
in isolation from the development of case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which deftly asserts exclusive jurisdiction to interpret 
this key structural principle of EU law. 
 The importance of the principle of conferral to determine the structure, func-
tioning and exercise of European Union (EU) law can hardly be over-estimated. 
From a sequential perspective, the principle of conferral is necessarily the very fi rst 
of all the structural principles to be applied. It may be diffi cult if not impossible to 
establish a full sequential order of the various structural principles underlying EU 
law, but all the other EU law principles are triggered only once this initial hurdle 
has successfully been cleared by the EU. 
 For a good understanding of the principle of conferral in all its complexity, it is 
opportune to clearly distinguish the following two functions. 
 The principle of conferral is fi rst and foremost the core principle that 
determines the delimitation of competence between the Member States and the 
EU. 3 At the same time it impacts directly on the relations between the EU and/
or its Member States with third countries and other international organisations 
as it underpins the limitations that may be placed on the legal personality of the 
Union. 4 
 The application of the principle of conferral also determines whether or not a 
subject matter comes within the ambit of the autonomous EU legal order, which is 
characterised by the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU, 5 primacy and direct effect. 
As such, it is the only one of all the Treaty principles that serves to determine not 
only whether and to what extent the EU has any competence but, additionally, 
whether and to what extent the CJEU may exercise exclusive jurisdiction. 
 The outcome of the application of the principle of conferral may nonetheless 
be very different in terms of the EU autonomous legal order as compared to EU 
competence. The Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the pillar structure and intro-
duces one legal personality for the whole EU, but this is not always and necessarily 
fully matched in substance. In many if not most cases there will be a  ‘ plain ’ or  ‘ full ’ 
conferral with a perfect match in terms of EU competence and CJEU exclusive 
jurisdiction. However, the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
is still to a large extent kept outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU, as well as demo-
cratic control by the European Parliament. 6 This may lead to what one could call 
a  crippled conferral, meaning that competence is conferred on the EU without 
the corresponding conferral to the autonomous EU legal order. Both judicial and 
democratic control are then left at the level solely of the Member States. Another 
complicating factor is that the integration of the former third pillar matters of 
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 7  Protocol No 21, opt-out of the United Kingdom and Ireland; Protocol No 22, special opt-out for 
Denmark. 
 8  Article 31 TEU. 
 9  For a recent example, see  Case C-73/14  Council v Commission (IRLOS) ,  Judgment EU:C:2015:663 . 
For an analysis of prior cases relating to the duty of sincere cooperation, see, eg,  M  Klamert ,  The Prin-
ciple of Loyalty in EU Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2014 ) ;  E  Neframi ,  ‘ The Duty of Loyalty : 
 Rethinking Its Scope Through Its Application in the Field of EU External Relations ’ ( 2010 )  47  CML 
Rev  323 ;  A  Casteleiro and  J  Larik ,  ‘ The Duty to Remain Silent :  Limitless Loyalty in EU External Rela-
tions ? ’ ( 2011 )  36  EL Rev  524 . 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) into the autonomous EU legal system has entailed 
the importation of the corresponding opt-outs for certain Member States. 7 
This implies that both EU competence and CJEU exclusive jurisdiction may be 
conferred on the Union by some Member States but not by others, thus lead-
ing to a situation of  split conferral. It is not inconceivable that the possibility to 
adopt CFSP measures under the constructive abstention mechanism, 8 whereby a 
Member State allows the other Member States to go ahead without being bound 
by the measure itself, could in practice even give rise to claims of a  crippled split 
conferral. 
 Especially since the Lisbon Treaty, it is therefore no longer suffi cient to deter-
mine  whether competence is conferred to the Union by the Treaties in any given 
case. The renewed line of questioning after the Lisbon Treaty is fi rst of all  who may 
determine whether competence has been transferred to the Union. The fi rst sec-
tion will therefore address the issue of whether conferral of competence is  ‘ to give 
or to grab ’ . In other words, is this now placed fi rmly in the hands of the Member 
States as masters of the Treaties, through the insertion of the catalogue of compe-
tence ? Or may the CJEU still continue to claim exclusive jurisdiction to settle EU 
competence issues, including the extent of its own jurisdiction ? 
 The second section will tackle the other and perhaps even more important new 
development to be discerned in the case law. In a post-Lisbon setting, the out-
spoken or underlying question has increasingly become the determination of the 
 modalities of the conferral of competence to the Union, be it in a plain, crippled 
or split form. As such, it is not only important to know whether the EU has been 
attributed competence but also on what legal basis this was, or should have been, 
done. A crucial question thus is to know whether it is the legal basis that deter-
mines the plain, crippled or split form of conferral, both in theory and practice, 
or whether the prospect of a crippled or split EU action in any way infl uences the 
fi nding of the proper legal basis. 
 By way of caveat, it should be underlined that the Lisbon Treaty reforms have 
sparked a renewed impetus of cases questioning the external competence of the 
Union in all its complexities. In spite of the sequential importance of the prin-
ciple of conferral, it is in practice not always easy to  ‘ isolate ’ this principle from 
other arguments, such as the application of the principle of institutional balance 
and/or the duty of sincere cooperation as laid down in Article 13(2) TEU and 
Article 4(3) TEU. 9 Conversely, it is not because the principle of conferral is invoked 
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 10  Case C-399/12  Germany v Council ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:2258 . For an analysis of the issues at 
stake in this case, see  I  Govaere ,  ‘ Novel Issues Pertaining to EU Member States ’ Membership of Other 
International Organisations: The  OIV Case ’ in  I  Govaere ,  E  Van Elsuwege ,  P  Stanislas and  S  Lannon 
(eds),  The EU in the World, Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau ( Leiden ,  Brill ,  2014 ) . 
 11  Opinion 2/94, EU:C:1996:140. 
 12  Article 6 TEU states the objective of accession to the ECHR yet does not determine the modalities 
to do so. The key issue is to safeguard the autonomy of the EU legal order in the process, see the nega-
tive opinion on the Draft Accession Agreement, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454. 
 13  For instance, Art 2 TFEU reads:  ‘ 1. When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence 
in a specifi c area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being 
able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. 2. 
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specifi c area, 
the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Mem-
ber States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. 
The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to 
cease exercising its competence ’ . 
in any given case that it is also really in dispute. For instance, in the  OIV case, 
Germany expressly invoked the principle of conferral albeit it did not really 
dispute the competence of the EU in the matter. Germany rather seemed to oppose 
the implications for the Member States, as well as to question to modalities of 
exercise of EU competence in international fora. 10 
 II. Quest for Control of the Principle of Conferral 
 A. Full Conferral of Competence: Proper Legal Basis 
 The Member States ’ endeavour to gain control over the principle of conferral as 
a reaction to prior case law of the CJEU can be discerned throughout the Lisbon 
Treaty. Contrary to what may be expected, this is not always and necessarily to 
restrict the transfer of competence to the Union. This is perfectly illustrated by 
the reaction in the Lisbon Treaty to prior case law of the CJEU concluding as to 
the absence of competence for the Union to adhere to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). 11 A remedy is now provided by the insertion of a legal 
basis in Article 6 TEU stipulating that the EU  ‘ shall accede ’ to the ECHR, thereby 
expressly conferring the competence to do so to the EU. The crucial question still 
left to be solved, especially after Opinion 2/13, is how to safeguard the autonomy 
of the EU legal order in this accession process. 12 
 Mostly, however, the Lisbon Treaty does not mean to transfer new competence 
to the Union. Rather the catalogue of competence inserted in Articles 2 to 6 TFEU 
appears to a large extent to codify prior case law of the CJEU in a static man-
ner. The Lisbon Treaty expressly lists the subject matters that fall under exclusive, 
shared or complementary competence of the Union. But it also goes further, as 
the Lisbon Treaty additionally spells out the different modalities, as well as conse-
quences for the Member States, of the conferral of competence. 13 
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 14  Article 207 TFEU expressly opens up the scope of the CCP to include commercial aspects of intel-
lectual property rights, services and foreign direct investments. 
 15  Case C-414/11  Daiichi Sankyo ,  Judgment, EU:C:2013:520 . 
 16  Case C-137/12  Commission v Council ,  Judgment, EU:C:2013:675 . 
 17  See,  inter alia ,  J  Larik ,  ‘ No Mixed Feelings :  The Post-Lisbon Common Commercial Policy in 
Daiichi Sankyo and Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention) ’ ( 2015 )  52  CML Rev 
 779 :  L  Ankersmit ,  ‘ The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon :  The  Daiichi  Sankyo 
and  Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments ’ ( 2014 )  41  Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration  193 . 
 18  Daiichi Sankyo (n 15) paras 52 – 53. The contextual criterion seemed very important in the  Daiichi 
Sankyo case, thus begging the question of the legal basis for so-called  ‘ TRIPS + ’ provisions in bilat-
eral agreements. On such TRIPS + obligations, see the respective contributions: M Aleman,  ‘ Impact 
of TRIPS-Plus Obligations in Economic Partnership and Free Trade Agreements on International 
IP Law ’ , and  S  Nadde-Phlix ,  ‘ IP Protection in EU Free Trade Agreements vis- à -vis IP Negotiations in 
the WTO ’ , both in  J  Drexl  et al ( eds) ,  EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better 
or Worse ? (Heidelberg ,  Springer ,  2014 ) 61 and 133, respectively. 
 19  Commission v Council (n 16) paras 64 – 65. 
 20  The CJEU consistently holds that the choice of legal basis has constitutional signifi cance, see 
Opinion 2/00, EU:C:2001:664, para 5. 
 The catalogue of competence thus provides some clarity and transparency 
which before was sometimes lacking. Unfortunately, in so doing it also creates 
a false sense of legal certainty as it leaves crucial issues regarding the principle of 
conferral untouched and unresolved. What, for instance, is the precise scope of the 
newly formulated Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 14 which is now expressly 
listed among the exclusive competences of the EU in Article 3(1) TFEU ? How 
should the conferral of competence be formulated if an agreement relates to dif-
ferent policies, such as both the CCP and the internal market, which are listed 
respectively as exclusive and shared competence ? Not surprisingly, such ques-
tions were already at the core of the early post-Lisbon case law of the CJEU in the 
 Daiichi Sankyo 15 case, as well as the  ‘ conditional access ’ 16 judgments. 17 The CJEU 
thus necessarily had to come up with new delineating criteria not expressly listed 
in the Lisbon Treaty to determine the precise legal basis of conferral of competence 
to the EU. As such, it clarifi ed that the CCP relates to measures which  ‘ specifi cally ’ 
relate to international trade. This was fulfi lled in both cases as they concerned 
either  ‘ external harmonisation ’ of intellectual property rights in the framework of 
TRIPS/WTO, 18 or the  ‘ externalisation of the internal market  acquis ’ for applica-
tion in third countries. 19 
 In spite of all the efforts made by the Member States to control the conferral of 
competence to the Union, it thus immediately became apparent with those fi rst 
post-Lisbon cases that they did not manage to completely forego the role of the 
CJEU in interpreting the newly inserted catalogue of competence.  However, in 
terms of modalities of conferral these were rather easy cases. The use of either 
legal basis, CCP or internal market, in any event implied a  ‘ full ’ conferral of 
competence, thus simultaneously to both the EU and the autonomous EU legal 
order. Considered from a constitutional perspective 20 and maintaining inter- 
institutional balance, the stakes were surely important, but in retrospect not as 
high as they  initially seemed. The above judgments were rapidly followed by more 
truly  challenging cases in terms of conferral of competences post-Lisbon. 
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 21  Case C-114/12  Commission v Council ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:2151 . 
 22  Opinion 1/13, EU:C:2014:2303. 
 23  Opinion 2/91, EU:C:1993:106. 
 24  Opinion 1/03, EU:C:2006:81. 
 25  Opinion 1/03 enlarges this to include  ‘ foreseeable developments ’ of EU law, see para 126: 
 ‘ However, it is not necessary for the areas covered by the international agreement and the Community 
legislation to coincide fully. Where the test of  “ an area which is already covered to a large extent by 
Community rules ” (Opinion 2/91, paragraphs 25 and 26) is to be applied, the assessment must be 
based not only on the scope of the rules in question but also on their nature and content. It is also 
necessary to take into account not only the current state of Community law in the area in question but 
also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis (see, to that effect, 
Opinion 2/91, paragraph 25) ’ . 
 26  Commission v Council (n 21) para 60. 
 27  I have argued elsewhere that only a clear and express prohibition in the Treaties could limit the 
purposive method of interpretation, as the CJEU adopts a  pro-legem , but not a  contra-legem interpre-
tation of the Treaties, see  I  Govaere ,  ‘ “ Setting the International Scene ” :  EU External Competence and 
Procedures Post-Lisbon Revisited in the Light of ECJ Opinion 1/13 ’ ( 2015 )  52  CML Rev  1277 . 
 B. Conferral of Competence: To Give or To Grab  ? 
 A degree of complexity was already added in the cases where the Member States 
pointed out that they clearly meant to reserve competence to themselves by 
virtue of the Lisbon Treaty. Such was the fi rm position of the Council and the 
Member States in both the  Broadcasting Organisations case 21 and Opinion 1/13. 22 
In both instances, they argued that the Member States, as masters of the Trea-
ties, had on purpose only expressly inserted the  ERTA test of  ‘ to affect internal 
measures or alter their scope ’ in Article 3(2) TFEU. In other words, they claimed 
that the Lisbon Treaty only partially codifi ed prior implied powers case law of the 
CJEU. The intended effect was thus to lead to a reversal of prior case law of the 
CJEU in the International Labour Organization (ILO) 23 and Lugano Convention 24 
Opinions which introduced the test of  ‘ already covered to a large extent ’ . 25 It was 
spelled out to the CJEU that to reinstate the latter case law post-Lisbon would 
amount to an unlawful extension of the scope of Article 3(3) TFEU contrary to 
the principle of conferral. 26 
 This argument fully exposes the underlying quest for control over the principle 
of conferral through the introduction and formulation of the catalogue of compe-
tence in the Lisbon Treaty. Is EU competence for the Member States to give, and if 
so also to freely take back, by virtue of the Treaties ? Or is conferral of competence a 
concept of EU law so that the CJEU may fi rmly grab control in order to safeguard 
a uniform and binding interpretation for all the Member States alike ? 
 It does not come as a total surprise that the CJEU was clearly not inclined to fol-
low the Member States in a textual interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Instead, 
it again turned to its habitual purposive method of interpretation of the Treaties, 
whereby it interprets individual EU law provisions in the light of the objectives 
of the EU Treaties. 27 As such, it pointed out that the ILO and Lugano Convention 
developments in implied powers reasoning were not new and separate tests but 
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 28  For a detailed analysis in terms of implied powers reasoning, see ibid. 
 29  Opinion 1/13, View of AG J ä ä skinen, EU:C:2014:2292, para 70. 
 30  Yet note that in a very early post-Lisbon case, the CJEU did point to the intention of the drafters 
of the Treaties, see  Case C-130/10  European Parliament v Council (Financial Sanctions)  EU:C:2012:472 , 
para 82:  ‘ Nevertheless, the difference between Article 75 TFEU and Article 215 TFEU, so far as the 
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Lisbon conferring a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the Union ’ s action under the 
CFSP ’ . 
 31  Commission v Council (n 21) para 73. 
 32  ibid para 74. Compare to Opinion 1/13 (n 22) para 74, which is very similar in formulation but 
with the added reference also to  ‘ foreseeable developments ’ of EU law by reference to Opinion 1/03. 
 33  A  Rosas ,  ‘ EU External Relations :  Exclusive Competence Revisited ’ ( 2015 )  38  Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal  1073, 1091 . 
rather interpretations of the original  ERTA test, which could thus still be applied 
post-Lisbon. 28 At least for the sake of clarity as to who controls the principle of 
conferral, it is to be welcomed that the CJEU, contrary, for instance, to Advocate 
General J ä ä skinen in his view on Opinion 1/13, 29 did not additionally search for 
the intention of the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty in order to guide its conclusions 
 in casu . 30 It also fi rmly rejected the reference to Protocol No 25 by pointing out 
that this protocol only applies to Article 2(2) TFEU in relation to the exercise of 
shared competence, and cannot serve to limit the conferral of exclusive compe-
tence to the EU by virtue of Article 3(2) TFEU. 31 
 Yet, what is then the meaning of the principle of conferral of competence for 
those cases ? Rather than making an abstract assessment on the basis of the Treaty 
provisions, the CJEU indicated that, to answer this crucial question, an assessment 
of the  ERTA criteria need to be made  in concreto , in the light of each case. In the 
words of the CJEU: 
 That said, it is important to note that, since the European Union has only conferred pow-
ers, any competence, especially where it is exclusive, must have its basis in conclusions 
drawn from a specifi c analysis of the relationship between the envisaged international 
agreement and the EU law in force, from which it is clear that such an agreement is 
capable of affecting the common EU rules or of altering their scope (see, to that effect, 
Opinion 1/03, EU:C:2006:81, paragraph 124). 32 
 This forceful statement is most likely meant to act as a counterweight to the gener-
ous application and interpretation of the  ERTA test. It is nonetheless diffi cult to 
disagree with Alan Rosas that the reasoning in Opinion 1/13 creates the impres-
sion of a low threshold for concluding as to an  ERTA effect, 33 and thus to the 
conferral of competence to the EU. 
 The same reasoning was already applied in the  Broadcasting Organisations 
judgment. A bit more puzzling, however, considering that it concerns a struc-
tural principle of constitutional signifi cance, is that the CJEU in the  Broadcasting 
Organisations case then proceeded to point to the burden of proof specifi cally in 
relation to the principle of conferral: 
 In accordance with the principle of conferral as laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU, 
it is, for the purposes of such an analysis, for the party concerned to provide evidence 
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 34  Commission v Council (n 21) para 75. 
 35  ibid para 95. 
 36  See, eg, the cases discussed in the previous section. 
to establish the exclusive nature of the external competence of the EU on which it seeks 
to rely. 34 
 Does the CJEU mean to say that there is a burden of proof solely in relation to 
the exclusive nature of EU competence, or with respect to the application of the 
principle of conferral itself ? And on who rests such a burden of proof ? Should the 
Commission  in casu provide all the necessary evidence, so as to avoid the conclu-
sion that (exclusive) competence is not transferred to the EU ? If so, to what extent 
is it then really up to the Council and the Member States to prove that the negotia-
tions  ‘ might also go beyond the EU  acquis ’ to support their claim that (exclusive) 
competence has not been conferred, rather than for the Commission to prove the 
contrary ? 35 
 In spite of those questions, the key issue with this reference to the burden of 
proof lies elsewhere. It could be maintained that the application of such a crucial 
structural principle as the principle of conferral should not depend mainly or even 
exclusively on whether the EU institutions have done their homework suffi ciently 
well. Could, or even should, it not be applied  ex offi cio by the CJEU ? Considering 
the similarity in reasoning of the CJEU in both cases, it is striking that Opinion 
1/13, which was rendered about one month after the  Broadcasting Organisations 
case, no longer mentions the burden of proof in relation to the principle of con-
ferral. This may in part be due to the fact that here it concerned an advisory opin-
ion rather than an adversary procedure, thereby clearly exposing the limits of the 
burden of proof approach adopted in the  Broadcasting Organisations case. What 
those cases reveal, however, is that the CJEU has maintained the application of 
the principle of conferral fi rmly within its grasp also post-Lisbon. Yet in so doing, 
it appears to be struggling to ascertain the precise grounds for, and limits to, its 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
 III. Special Modalities of Conferral 
 In post-Lisbon practice, not many cases openly address the issue of whether or not 
external power is at all conferred to the EU, in spite of the theoretical importance 
of the question. More often, cases expressly or impliedly raise the issue of the pre-
cise modalities of the conferral, 36 with the added diffi culty in terms of possible 
crippled and/or split conferral of competence. 
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 37  See especially  Case C-91/05  Commission v Council (ECOWAS) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2008:288 . On 
this case, see, eg,  B  Van Vooren ,  ‘ EU – EC External Competences after the Small Arms Judgment ’ ( 2009 ) 
 14  European Foreign Affairs Review  7 . 
 38  See  section III B (i) below. 
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 40  Article 24 TEU specifi es:  ‘ It shall be defi ned and implemented by the European Council and the 
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Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accord-
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Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ’ . 
 41  Article 40 TEU (ex Art 47 TEU) reads:  ‘ The implementation of the common foreign and security 
policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions 
laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed 
 A. Crippled and Semi-crippled Conferral of Competence 
 Already before the Lisbon Treaty it was theoretically possible to determine a crip-
pled conferral of competence, whereby competence would be conferred to the EU 
without the corresponding conferral to the autonomous legal system. Pre-Lisbon, 
both the CFSP and JHA pillars were to a large extent kept outside the scope of EU 
judicial and EU democratic control in favour of bundling such control at the level 
of the Member States. The practical effect thereof was, however, strongly mitigated 
by the clear statement in ex Article 47 TEU that the two EU pillars should not 
affect the European Community (EC) pillar. This allowed the CJEU to jealousy 
shield the external  acquis communautaire against any unwarranted infl uence from 
those intergovernmental pillars. 37 Full conferral of competence to the EC was thus 
systematically favoured over a crippled conferral to the EU. The Lisbon Treaty has 
fundamentally altered this given. 
 (i) Redressing Full and Crippled Competence 
 The Lisbon Treaty at fi rst sight simplifi es the system. It formally abolishes the 
 pillar structure which leads to the incorporation of the former third pillar into the 
autonomous EU legal order. 38 But at the same time it re-inserts the CFSP as a  ‘ hor-
izontal pillar ’ 39 by stipulating in Article 24 TEU that  ‘ (t)he common foreign and 
security policy is subject to specifi c rules and procedures ’ . In essence, this implies 
that the intergovernmental approach still prevails for CFSP measures post-Lisbon, 
whereby also judicial and democratic control is largely kept at national level, thus 
outside the autonomous EU legal order. 40 With respect to CFSP, the major change 
in terms of conferral of competence is, however, to be found in Article 40 TEU 
which redrafts the former Article 47 TEU. 41 It is still stipulated that the CFSP shall 
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institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter ’ . 
 42  See also  A  Dashwood ,  ‘ The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action ’ in  I  Govaere ,  E  Van 
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 43  Financial Sanctions (n 30). 
 44  ibid, para 32. 
 45  Art 275 TFEU. 
 46  Financial Sanctions (n 30) paras 79 – 80. 
 47  ibid para 80. 
 48  ibid para 82. 
not affect  ‘ other external EU action ’ listed in the TFEU. But, importantly, a coun-
terweight is added in the second paragraph stipulating that that  ‘ other external 
EU action ’ may not affect the exercise of the Union competences under the CFSP. 
 In so doing, the Lisbon Treaty radically alters the prior approach as it removes 
the possibility to systematically favour full conferral over crippled conferral of 
competence. 42 This was clearly illustrated already by the very fi rst post-Lisbon 
case, the  Financial Sanctions case, relating to a dispute between the European 
Parliament and the Council on the proper legal basis to adopt restrictive meas-
ures against certain persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the 
Al - Qaeda network and the Taliban. 43 The European Parliament had expressly 
drawn the CJEU ’ s attention to the continuing crippled nature of conferral of com-
petence by virtue of the CFSP post-Lisbon. In particular, the European Parliament 
evoked the consequences in terms of the level of exercise of democratic control 
in case the legal basis for a full conferral, Article 75 TFEU, was rejected in favour 
of Article 215 TFEU. 44 This instance is nonetheless special for it only presented 
features of  ‘ semi-crippled conferral ’ as it concerned the adoption of fi nancial sanc-
tions which, even under the CFSP, exceptionally come under judicial control of the 
CJEU. 45 As such, the only issue at stake was whether democratic control could be 
kept at the level of the Member States whilst conferring competence to the EU and 
exclusive jurisdiction to the CJEU. 
 In line with the newly formulated Article 40 TEU, the CJEU fi rmly rejected 
the reasoning that the prospect of a full or (semi-)crippled conferral of compe-
tence should determine the legal basis withheld. The Court held that the fact that 
the European Parliament is only informed and not a co-legislator under CFSP 
cannot determine the choice of legal basis. 46 Instead, it agreed with the Coun-
cil that  ‘ it is not procedures that defi ne the legal basis of a measure but the legal 
basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that 
measure ’ . 47 The full importance of the renewed post-Lisbon setting in terms of 
conferral of competence was made clear by further underlining: 
 [T]he difference between Article 75 TFEU and Article 215 TFEU, so far as the Parlia-
ment ’ s involvement is concerned, is the result of the choice made by the framers of the 
Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the 
Union ’ s action under the CFSP. 48 
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 49  The fact that both the CFSP and  ‘ other ’ external relations agreements are to be concluded on the 
basis of Art 218 TFEU seems to set this question apart from the procedural issue in relation to  ‘ mixed 
agreements ’ concluded on behalf of both the EU and its Member States. In relation to the latter, see 
 Case C-28/12  Commission v Council (Mixed International Agreements) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2015:282 , see 
especially paras 47 – 53. At paras 49 and 50, the CJEU points in particular to the following:  ‘ (49) First, 
that decision in fact merges two different acts, namely, on the one hand, an act relating to the signing 
of the agreements at issue on behalf of the European Union and their provisional application by it and, 
on the other, an act relating to the provisional application of those agreements by the Member States, 
without it being possible to discern which act refl ects the will of the Council and which the will of the 
Member States. (50) It follows that the Member States participated in the adoption of the act relating 
to the signing of the agreements at issue on behalf of the European Union and their provisional appli-
cation by it although, under Article 218(5) TFEU, such an act must be adopted by the Council alone. 
Moreover, the Council was involved, as an EU institution, in the adoption of the act concerning the 
provisional application of those agreements by the Member States although such an act falls within the 
scope of, fi rst of all, the internal law of each of those States and, then, international law. ’ For a comment, 
see  C  Flaesch-Mougin , ( 2015 )  Revue Trimestrelle De Droit Europ é en  617 . 
 50  Financial Sanctions (n 30) para 47. 
 51  ibid para 48. 
 52  ibid para 49. 
 This clearly shows that all the Treaty legal bases relating to external relations are 
now on an equal footing and should be assessed on their own merit. 
 (ii) Mixed Legal Basis CFSP: Other External Action ? 
 The above fi nding leads to the next question: if in a post-Lisbon setting full 
 conferral of competence can no longer be systematically favoured over crippled 
conferral, is it then at all conceivable to determine a mixed legal basis of the CFSP 
and other EU external action ? In other words, is it possible to combine full and 
crippled conferral of competence in relation to one and the same legal act ? The 
common procedural provision for the conclusion of agreements inserted by the 
Lisbon Treaty, Article 218 TFEU, could perhaps seem to militate in favour of such 
a conclusion. 49 However, the  Financial Sanctions case raises important considera-
tions in this respect. The CJEU pointed to the absence of democratic control by 
the EU under the CFSP as compared to the full democratic control at EU level for 
other external action, 50 to conclude forcefully  ‘ (d)ifferences of that kind are such 
as to render those procedures incompatible ’ . 51 The CJEU proceeded unequivocally 
to spell out the consequences: 
 It follows from the foregoing that, even if the contested regulation does pursue several 
objectives at the same time or have several components indissociably linked, without 
one ’ s being secondary to the other, the differences in the procedures applicable under 
Articles 75 TFEU and 215(2) TFEU mean that it is not possible for the two provisions to 
be cumulated, one with the other, in order to serve as a twofold legal basis for a measure 
such as the contested regulation. 52 
 If it is fundamentally incompatible to combine semi-crippled and full conferral 
of competence because of the different level of democratic control, then it would 
surely not be logical to allow for a mixed legal basis including a CFSP provision 
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 53  ibid paras 55 – 66. 
 54  See, eg, the respective contributions by C Hillion,  ‘ Fighting Terrorism Through the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy ’ and  J  Czuczai ,  ‘ The Powers of the Council Concerning the Emergency of 
International Terrorism after the Judgment in Case C-130/10 Parliament v. Council ’ both in  I  Govaere 
and  S  Poli (eds),  EU Management of Global Emergencies :  Legal Framework for Combating Threats and 
Crises ( Leiden ,  Brill ,  2014 )  75 and 97, respectively. 
 55  Case C-658/11  European Parliament v Council (Mauritius Agreement) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:2025 . 
For a comment, see  P  Van Elsuwege ,  ‘ Securing the Institutional Balance in the Procedure for 
Concluding International Agreements :  European Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement 
with Mauritius) ’ ( 2015 )  52  CML Rev  1379 . 
 56  Mauritius Agreement (n 55) paras 44 – 45. 
other than Article 215 TFEU. A strong case can be made that truly crippled confer-
ral under CFSP, whereby not only democratic control by the European Parliament 
but additionally all judicial control by the CJEU is excluded, can never go hand 
in hand with a fi nding of full conferral on the basis of other Treaty provisions. 
One and the same measure can hardly at the same time be within and outside the 
autonomous EU legal order. But such a conclusion would then entail that, instead, 
a clear and often diffi cult choice will need to be made between the CFSP and other 
EU external action as a legal basis where a measure has multiple objectives. 
 (iii) Centre of Gravity Test 
 This begs the question of what objective legal criteria could and should be used 
by the CJEU to determine the proper legal basis of the conferral. An easy answer 
is, of course, to point to the centre of gravity test to determine a full or crippled 
conferral of competence. But this is only half of the answer. The precise crite-
ria to be applied to establish the gravity in each and every case may be less easy 
to pinpoint in a satisfactory manner. Again this was illustrated by the  Financial 
Sanctions case. Here, the CJEU fi rst invoked the centre of gravity test and pro-
ceeded to rule in favour of the CFSP as the sole legal basis. It held in essence that 
Article 215 TFEU provides for action to counter the threat of  ‘ international ’ ter-
rorism, in relation to persons in third countries. 53 This was held to be the case of 
the envisaged measure so that Article 75 TFEU, which should then be taken to 
refer to fi nancial sanctions to counter threats  ‘ internal ’ to the Area of  Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), was not withheld. Not surprisingly, much of the 
debate in legal doctrine has focused precisely on these criteria laid down by the 
CJEU, 54 as it seems especially diffi cult to isolate international from internal 
terrorism in practice. 
 The centre of gravity test was also put forward in the subsequent  Mauritius 
Agreement case 55 which again opposed the European Parliament to the Council 
concerning a measure relating to both the CFSP and other external action of the 
EU. Yet, this time, the dispute did not concern the proper legal basis for the confer-
ral of the competence as such. The European Parliament in fact expressly agreed 
with the use of the sole legal basis of Article 37 TEU to the extent that the other 
external relations objectives were merely incidental to the principle aim of the 
Agreement relating to the CFSP. 56 Instead, the European Parliament sought to 
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 57  Article 218(6) TFEU reads as follows:  ‘ The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt 
a decision concluding the agreement. Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common 
foreign and security policy, the Council shall adopt the decision concluding the agreement: (a) after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: (i) association agreements; 
(ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms; (iii) agreements establishing a specifi c institutional framework by organ-
ising cooperation procedures; (iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
(v) agreements covering fi elds to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special 
legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. The European Parliament 
and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit for consent; (b) after consulting 
the European Parliament in other cases. The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a 
time-limit which the Council may set depending on the urgency of the matter. In the absence of an 
opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act ’ . 
 58  Mauritius Agreement (n 55) paras 57 – 58. The CJEU fi rst reasoned in terms of symmetry in 
internal measures and international agreements, in compliance with the institutional balance, see also 
para 56. 
 59  The CJEU further reasoned as follows in para 60:  ‘ That interpretation is justifi ed particularly in 
the light of the requirements relating to legal certainty. By anchoring the procedural legal basis to the 
substantive legal basis of a measure, this interpretation enables the applicable procedure to be deter-
mined on the basis of objective criteria that are amenable to judicial review, as noted in paragraph 43 of 
the present judgment. That ensures consistency, moreover, in the choice of legal bases for a measure. By 
contrast, the interpretation advocated by the Parliament would have the effect of introducing a degree 
of uncertainty and inconsistency into that choice, insofar as it would be liable to result in the applica-
tion of different procedures to acts of EU law which have the same substantive legal basis ’ . 
 60  Mauritius Agreement (n 55) paras 75 – 76. 
alter the status of the Agreement from a crippled conferral to more of a full confer-
ral through the backdoor of the unitary procedural provision for the conclusion of 
agreements, Article 218 TFEU. 
 (iv) Reducing the Handicap 
 The argument of the European Parliament in the  Mauritius Agreement case fi rst 
of all went that considering the underlying multiple objectives of the Mauritius 
Agreement it did not constitute an  ‘ agreement exclusively related to the CFSP ’ , so 
that the Parliament should have been duly consulted pursuant to Article 218(6) 
TFEU. 57 The CJEU, however, rejected this interpretation by reiterating that the 
substantive legal basis of a measure determines the procedure to be followed, and 
not vice versa, with the additional clarifi cation that this includes the procedures 
under Article 218(6) TFEU. 58 In other words, if the sole legal basis legitimately 
withheld exclusively confers a crippled competence to the EU, then the handicap 
in terms of EU level democratic procedures cannot be remedied by pointing to 
other incidental (full) competence nor to the common procedural provision for 
the conclusion of agreements. 59 
 The second argument of the European Parliament was, however, more  successful. 
The CJEU agreed that the Council had nonetheless infringed Article 218(10) 
TFEU by failing to immediately and fully inform the European Parliament at 
all stages of the procedure for negotiating and concluding the EU – Mauritius 
Agreement. 60 The CJEU refused to equate the European Parliament ’ s exclusion 
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 61  ibid paras 79 – 87. However, the CJEU added:  ‘ It must be acknowledged that annulment of the 
contested decision without maintenance of its effects would be liable to hamper the conduct of opera-
tions carried out on the basis of the EU – Mauritius Agreement and, in particular, the full effectiveness 
of the prosecutions and trials of suspected pirates arrested by EUNAVFOR ’ (para 90). 
 62  ibid para 70. 
 63  ibid para 73. 
 64  Case C-425/13  Commission v Council (Negotiating Directives) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2015:483 , para 62. 
The main issue in this case concerned Art 218(4) TFEU and institutional balance. 
from the procedures for negotiating and concluding a CFSP-based agreement with 
a total absence of a right of scrutiny. Instead, it pointed out that the Lisbon Treaty 
precisely enhanced the importance of the exercise, at EU level, of democratic 
scrutiny of EU external action by inserting this information obligation applica-
ble to all the types of procedures listed in Article 218 TFEU, including the CFSP. 
Article 218(10) TFEU was held to be an essential procedural requirement, breach 
of which necessarily leads to the annulment of the contested decision. 61 
 Very importantly, in so doing, the CJEU also forcefully claimed its own juris-
diction to fully interpret the common procedural provision of Article 218 TFEU. 
It fi rmly rejected the argument of the Council that, since the CJEU in principle 
has no jurisdiction to control the CFSP, it also has no jurisdiction to rule on 
the legality of a measure adopted on the basis of the CFSP. The CJEU pointed 
out that Articles 24(1) TEU and 275(1) TFEU introduce a derogation to the 
rule of general jurisdiction of the CJEU laid down in Article 19 TEU, so that, 
like all derogations, they  ‘ must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly ’ . 62 The CJEU 
concluded that: 
 [I]t cannot be argued that the scope of the limitation, by way of derogation, on the 
Court ’ s jurisdiction envisaged in the fi nal sentence of the second subparagraph of 
Article 24(1) TEU and in Article 275 TFEU goes so far as to preclude the Court from hav-
ing jurisdiction to interpret and apply a provision such as Article 218 TFEU which does 
not fall within the CFSP, even though it lays down the procedure on the basis of which an 
act falling within the CFSP has been adopted. 63 
 As a consequence, the CJEU may thus annul any decision, including exclusively 
CFSP measures, for breach of an essential procedural requirement listed in 
Article 218 TFEU. As a counterpart, this most likely entails that the CJEU would 
also claim jurisdiction to deliver a corresponding Advisory Opinion under 
Article 218(11) TFEU, not shying away from envisaged CFSP agreements. The 
recent statement by the CJEU that  ‘ Article 218 TFEU constitutes, as regards the 
conclusion of international treaties, an autonomous and general provision of con-
stitutional scope ’ , 64 appears to be foreboding in this respect. 
 As a result of such case law, which deftly explores the potential of the unitary 
procedural provision of Article 218 TFEU, the CFSP thus becomes a bit less of a 
crippled competence than it was most likely intended to be by the Member States 
in the Lisbon Treaty. One may discern an echo of pre-Lisbon case law, notably in 
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 65  Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P  Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation v Council and Commission ( Kadi I ) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2008:461 and  Joined Cases C-584/10P, 
C-593/10P and C-595/1P  Commission and others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi ( Kadi II ) ,  Judgment, 
EU:C:2013:518 ;  I  Govaere ,  ‘ The Importance of International Developments in the Case-law of the 
European Court of Justice:  Kadi and the Autonomy of the EC Legal Order ’ in  M  Hiscock and  W  van 
Caenegem (eds),  The Internationalisation of Law :  Legislation, Decision – Making, Practice and Education 
( Cheltenham ,  Edward Elgar Publishing ,  2010 )  187 . Much has been written about these cases, see the 
doctrine mentioned in  S  Poli and  M  Tzanou ,  ‘ The  Kadi Rulings :  A Survey of the Literature ’ ( 2009 )  28 
 Yearbook of European Law  533 ;  M  Avbelj ,  F  Fontanelli and  G  Martinico (eds),  Kadi on Trial :  A Multifac-
eted Analysis of the Kadi Trial ( London ,  Routledge ,  2014 ) . 
 66  Codifi ed in Art 275(2) TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 67  Article 31 TEU. 
 68  See Protocols Nos 21 and 22, respectively. This should be read together with Declaration 65 : 
 ‘ Declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Article 75 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. The United Kingdom fully supports robust action with 
regard to adopting fi nancial sanctions designed to prevent and combat terrorism and related activi-
ties. Therefore, the United Kingdom declares that it intends to exercise its right under Article 3 of the 
Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security 
and justice to take part in the adoption of all proposals made under Article 75 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ’ . 
the  Kadi cases, 65 where the CJEU already fi rmly claimed jurisdiction to perform 
a legality control, including of CFSP related measures for respect of fundamen-
tal rights. 66 But as important as it may be, case law merely reduces and cannot 
totally overcome the initial handicap for the application of the autonomous EU 
legal order in CFSP matters written into the Lisbon Treaty. At best, it qualifi es the 
degree of crippled conferral short of turning it into a full conferral. 
 B. Split Conferral 
 A different problem is posed where most but not all of the Member States confer 
competence to the EU. Already prior to the Lisbon Treaty this was made possible 
by the insertion of the constructive abstention procedure as regards the CFSP. 67 
A number of Member States may thus decide not to be bound by a CFSP measure 
but to allow the others to go ahead. For the latter, the conferral of powers takes 
place without the corresponding transfer to the autonomous EU legal order. Using 
a CFSP legal basis together with the constructive abstention procedure thus in fact 
amounts to a combined split crippled conferral which remains to a large extent 
outside the control of the CJEU. 
 (i) Post-Lisbon Split Conferral 
 The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the fact that the former third pillar is abol-
ished and fully incorporated into the autonomous EU legal order, thus in principle 
leading to a full conferral of competence to the EU. The diffi culty lies, however, 
in the fact that the opt-outs for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have 
been expressly confi rmed to apply in a post-Lisbon setting. 68 Triggering the 
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 69  See  I  Govaere and  V  Demedts ,  ‘ Quelle d é fi nition de l ’ “ externe ” en mati è re d ’ ELSJ ? Le cadre et 
les enjeux ’ in  C  Flaesch-Mougin and  LS  Rossi (eds),  La dimension ext é rieure de l ’ espace de libert é , de 
s é curit é et de justice de l ’ Union europ é enne apr è s le trait é de Lisbonne ( Brussels ,  Bruylant ,  2013 )  489 ; 
E Neframi,  ‘ L ’ aspect externe de l ’ espace de libert é , de s é curit é et de justice: quel respect des principes 
et objectifs de l ’ action ext é rieure de l ’ Union ? ’ in ibid 510. 
 70  Case C-658/11  European Parliament v Council (Mauritius Agreement) ,  Opinion of AG Bot, 
EU:C:2014:41 , paras 106 – 8. 
 71  Case C-377/12  Commission v Council (Philippines Agreement) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:1903 . 
 72  On this case, see  M  Broberg and  R  Holdgaard ,  ‘ Demarcating the Union ’ s Development Coopera-
tion Policy after Lisbon :  Commission v. Council (Philippines PCFA) ’ ( 2015 )  52  CML Rev  547 . 
opt-outs with respect to external measures relating to the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice therefore amount to a straightforward split conferral under 
the control of the CJEU. This has induced a novel line of questioning in terms 
of external relations competence which, however, is still in a rather  embryonic 
state. 69 
 The diffi culty of coming to terms with those important variations of split 
 conferral in a post-Lisbon era was not really acknowledged in the  Mauritius 
 Agreement case. Advocate General Bot did, however, expressly point to the neces-
sity to delineate between the external action of (respectively) the EU as such, the 
Area of Freedom Security and Justice, and the CFSP but without analysing the 
different modalities of conferral involved. 70 
 (ii) Split or Full Conferral ? 
 The issue of the split conferral was posed again in the  Philippines Agreement case. 71 
Whereas it was not disputed that a double legal basis, the CCP and development 
cooperation, was indicated  in casu nor that the Agreement should be concluded in 
a mixed form, ie on behalf of the both the EU and the Member States, the addition 
of other legal bases was a source of confl ict and institutional bickering. The CJEU 
in essence agreed with the Commission that development cooperation should be 
broadly interpreted so as to  ‘ absorb ’ the provisions in the Agreement relating to 
transport and environment, but also re-admission of third country nationals. 72 In 
so doing, the CJEU downplayed the importance of the lack of conferral of com-
petence by the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark by virtue of the opt-outs. 
Instead, it determined a full conferral to the EU by all the Member States under the 
development cooperation legal basis. 
 Contrary to the environment and transport chapters, the CJEU did acknowl-
edge that the Agreement contained  ‘ specifi c obligations ’ for the contracting par-
ties as concerns re-admission of third country nationals. In particular, the CJEU 
pointed out that: 
 [the] Republic of the Philippines and the Member States undertake therein to readmit 
their nationals who do not fulfi l, or no longer fulfi l, the conditions of entry or resi-
dence on the territory of the other party, upon request by the latter and without undue 
delay once the nationality of those nationals has been established and due process 
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 73  Philippines Agreement (n 71) para 57. 
 74  ibid para 58:  ‘ Whilst Article 26(3) of the Framework Agreement does admittedly contain word-
ing stating how requests for readmission are to be dealt with, the fact remains that, as is apparent 
from Article 26(2)(f), the readmission of persons residing without authorisation is included in 
Article 26 as one of the matters upon which cooperation on migration and development will have to 
focus, without it being covered at this stage by detailed provisions enabling its implementation, such 
as those contained in a readmission agreement. It cannot therefore be considered that Article 26 of 
the Framework Agreement prescribes in concrete terms the manner in which cooperation concerning 
readmission of nationals of the contracting parties is to be implemented, a conclusion which is rein-
forced by the commitment, in Article 26(4), to conclude a readmission agreement very soon ’ . 
 75  ibid para 59. 
 76  ibid para 22. Article 3(2) TEU stipulates:  ‘ The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigra-
tion and the prevention and combating of crime ’ . Article 4(2) TEU reads:  ‘ The Union shall respect 
 carried out, and to provide their nationals with documents required for such purposes. 
They also agree to conclude an agreement governing admission and readmission as soon 
as possible. 73 
 In spite of such clear and specifi c obligations pinpointed in the Agreement, the 
CJEU nonetheless justifi ed the disregard of the opt-outs by reference to the absence 
of  ‘ detailed ’ provisions for the implementation of the re-admission  process. The 
fact that reference is made in the Agreement to the future conclusion of a readmis-
sions agreement apparently served to support such a conclusion. 74 On this basis, 
the CJEU proceeded to state that: 
 the provisions of the Framework Agreement relating to readmission of nationals of the 
contracting parties, to transport and to the environment do not contain obligations so 
extensive that they may be considered to constitute objectives distinct from those of 
development cooperation that are neither secondary nor indirect in relation to the latter 
objectives. 75 
 This reasoning immediately triggers the question as to when  ‘ specifi c ’ provisions 
on re-admission of third country nationals would be considered to be  ‘ suffi ciently 
detailed ’ and thus  ‘ suffi ciently extensive ’ so as to justify recourse to a split conferral 
legal basis. 
 (iii) Mixed Legal Basis, Full and Split Conferral ? 
 A crucial underlying issue is whether, and if so when, the CJEU would allow a 
combined use of a full and split conferral as legal bases. It cannot go unnoticed 
that in the  Philippines Agreement case, the Commission had forcefully spelled 
out that, in particular, the addition of Article 79(3) TFEU as a legal basis would 
produce unwarranted legal effects, both internally and externally. The Commis-
sion had warned that such a legal basis would trigger the opt-outs under Proto-
cols No 21 and No 22, thereby leading not only to incompatible procedures but 
also to uncertainty about the degree of exercise of the EU ’ s competence under 
Articles 3(2) TFEU and 4(2) TFEU. 76 The Council had countered this argument 
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the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. 
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains 
the sole responsibility of each Member State ’ . 
 77  Philippines Agreement (n 71) para 31. 
 78  This also follows from Recitals 2 and 3 in the Preamble to the contested decision in the 
 Philippines case:  ‘ (2) The provisions of the [Framework] Agreement that fall within the scope of Part 
Three, Title V of the [TFEU] bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting Parties, 
and not as part of the European Union, unless the European Union together with the United Kingdom 
and/or Ireland have jointly notifi ed the Republic of the Philippines that the United Kingdom or Ireland 
is bound as part of the European Union in accordance with the Protocol (No 21) on the position of 
the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to 
the [EU Treaty] and the [TFEU]. If the United Kingdom and/or Ireland cease(s) to be bound as part 
of the European Union in accordance with Article 4a of the Protocol (No 21), the European Union 
together with the United Kingdom and/or Ireland are to immediately inform the Republic of the 
Philippines of any change in their position in which case they are to remain bound by the provisions of 
the [Framework] Agreement in their own right. The same applies to Denmark in accordance with the 
Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark annexed to those Treaties. (3) Where the United Kingdom 
and/or Ireland has/have not provided the notifi cation required under Article 3 of the Protocol (No 21) 
on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, they do not take part in the adoption by the Council of this Decision to the extent that it covers 
provisions pursuant to Part Three, Title V of the [TFEU]. The same applies to Denmark in accordance 
with the Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ’ . 
 79  Case C-81/13  United Kingdom v Council (Turkey Agreement) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:2449 , 
para 37. 
 80  Case C-656/11  United Kingdom v Council (Swiss Agreement) ,  Judgment, EU:C:2014:97 . 
 81  Case C-431/11  United Kingdom v Council ,  Opinion of AG Kokott, EU:C:2013:187 , paras 39 – 41. 
 82  Case C-431/11  United Kingdom v Council ,  Judgment, EU:C:2013:589 , para 63. 
by fi rst of all reiterating the CJEU ’ s statements in the above-mentioned  ‘ crippled 
conferral ’ cases, namely that  ‘ it is not procedures that defi ne the legal basis of a 
measure but the legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be 
followed in adopting that measure ’ . 77 The Council also pointed out that the obli-
gations of the various Member States may not vary all that much in practice, as 
the opted-out Member States may choose to opt in to a particular measure or to 
conclude similar obligations with the third country bilaterally. It is clear, however, 
that in the latter case they would only be bound by virtue of international law and 
not by virtue of EU law, 78 thus not resolving the unwarranted legal effect the Com-
mission was referring to. 
 Subsequent case law has clarifi ed that  ‘ Protocol No 21 is not capable of having 
any effect whatsoever on the question of the correct legal basis for the adoption of 
the contested decision ’ . 79 At least, not in the sense that the United Kingdom could 
successfully claim the (additional) use of Article 79 TFEU as the correct legal basis 
for external measures as soon as it related to the situation of third country nation-
als. Already in the  EEA Agreement and  Swiss Agreement 80 cases, relating to social 
security for EEA and Swiss nationals respectively, the CJEU followed the interpre-
tation of Advocate General Kokott, 81 whereby Article 79 TFEU was held to strictly 
relate to the development of external borders measures, in terms of border checks, 
asylum and migration. 82 This was held to be different from and even  ‘ manifestly 
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 83  ibid para 64. 
 84  For a recent assessment of the functioning of the EEA agreement, see  H  Fredriksen ,  C  Franklin , 
 ‘ Of Pragmatism and Principles :  The EEA Agreement 20 Years On ’ ( 2015 )  52  CML Rev  629 . 
 85  United Kingdom v Council (n 82) para 58. The CJEU further pointed out that to allow the  opt-outs 
to be triggered in such a case would lead to two parallel regimes for the coordination of social secu-
rity systems (para 65). Also in  Swiss Agreement (n 80), the CJEU pointed out that the EU extended 
the application of its legislation concerning coordination of social security systems to the Swiss 
Confederation, see paras 55 – 67. 
 86  United Kingdom v Council (n 82) paras 66 – 67. 
 87  Turkey Agreement (n 79) para 38. The CJEU referred in this respect to  United Kingdom v Council 
(n 82) para 48, and  Swiss Agreement (n 80) para 50. 
 88  Turkey Agreement (n 79) paras 43 – 45. 
 89  ibid para 59:  ‘ As a rule, it is only in the sphere of the internal policies and actions of the European 
Union or of the external actions relating to third countries which can be placed on the same foot-
ing as Member State of the European Union, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 58 of this 
judgment, that Article 48 TFEU empowers the European Union to adopt measures in this area ’ . 
irreconcilable ’ 83 with the objectives of the EEA Agreement, as the latter means 
to extend 84 internal market measures to the third countries concerned. 85 Full 
 conferral of competence under Article 48 TFEU was therefore withheld rather 
than a split conferral on the basis of Article 79 TFEU. 
 Interestingly, however, in the European Economic Agreement (EEA) Agreement 
cases, the CJEU also plainly rejected the reasoning of the United Kingdom invok-
ing the use of Article 79 TFEU for other similar decisions in relation to other third 
countries. It was spelled out that each act must be assessed on its own aim and 
content in order to establish the proper legal basis. 86 In theory, this would then 
imply that similar decisions relating to different Agreements could have a different 
legal basis and thus also entail different modalities in terms of conferral of compe-
tence. Such a reverse reasoning was subsequently invoked by the United Kingdom 
in the  Turkey Agreement case, in order to justify a different outcome here and to 
accept Article 79 TFEU as the correct legal basis. The CJEU, however, rejected 
this conclusion by pointing out that besides the objectives and content, also the 
 ‘ context ’ of a measure needs to be taken into account, in particular where it con-
cerns an amendment of rules adopted under an existing agreement. 87  In casu , the 
measure was adopted in the context of the EEC – Turkey 1963  Association Agree-
ment, constituting a further step in the objective to progressively secure free move-
ment for workers between the European Union and Turkey under the  Association 
Agreement. 88 
 If the contextual setting was thus similar, the main difference was to be found 
in the different objective of the Turkey Association Agreement which falls short 
of the EEA Agreement objective to extend the internal market to the third coun-
try concerned. The CJEU therefore agreed with the United Kingdom that the 
contested decision could not legitimately be adopted exclusively on the basis 
of Article 48 TFEU. 89 But it disagreed that it was the split conferral legal basis 
of  Article 79 TFEU that should be added. The CJEU conceded to the United 
 Kingdom that: 
 it is true that Article 79(2)(b) TFEU empowers the European Union to adopt meas-
ures defi ning the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, 
90 Inge Govaere
 including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other 
Member States 90 
 only to immediately limit the scope of application to serve strictly the purposes 
of Article 79(1) TFEU in terms of the common immigration policy. 91 Instead, 
the CJEU held that the respect for the principle of conferral, which was at stake  in 
casu , could be safeguarded by the addition of Article 217 TFEU which was also the 
legal basis for the initial Association Agreement. The latter legal basis provides full 
conferral of external competence to the EU in all the fi elds covered by the TFEU. 
 Neither of those cases thus allowed for a combined full and split conferral, 
instead the legal basis which led to a full conferral was systematically preferred by 
the CJEU. The context criterion might in practice serve to exclude the addition 
of a split conferral legal basis to any post-Lisbon measure adopted in the con-
text of a pre-Lisbon agreement. Yet the  Philippines Agreement case shows that it is 
also highly unlikely for the use of a double legal basis for conferral to become the 
standard procedure for post-Lisbon Agreements. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 The Lisbon Treaty has triggered a renewed line of questioning with respect to 
the principle of conferral which goes to a large extent still unresolved. Certainly, 
the CJEU has fi rmly asserted its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret this crucial 
 structural principle so as to determine whether or not competence is transferred 
to the EU in any given case. But it appears to be more diffi cult to come to terms 
with the various post-Lisbon modalities of conferral of powers to the EU and the 
variations in terms of full, crippled and split conferral. 
 The CJEU recurrently states that it is the legal basis of a measure that deter-
mines the procedures to be followed, not vice versa. Such a statement does not 
always appear to be consonant with the impression created by the outcome of 
post- Lisbon case law. The above analysis of the cases rendered so far seems to 
indicate a systematic preference for conferral of competence to the EU and the 
autonomous EU legal order alike, be it under full conferral or a semi-crippled 
conferral. This is in spite of Article 40 TEU, which redresses the balance between 
the CFSP and other external EU action. The handicap in terms of pure crippled 
conferral under the CFSP, whereby control by both the CJEU and the European 
Parliament is in principle excluded, is as much as possible reduced by deftly 
 90  ibid para 41. 
 91  ibid para 42:  ‘ [T]hat is to say for the purposes of the common immigration policy aimed at ensur-
ing the effi cient management of migration fl ows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing 
legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration 
and traffi cking in human beings ’ . 
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exploring the potential of the unitary procedural provision of Article 218 TFEU. 
It is most likely highly signifi cant for future case law that the CJEU has recently 
labelled this procedural provision for the conclusion of agreements as  ‘ an autono-
mous and general provision of constitutional scope ’ . 
 The post-Lisbon importance of possible split conferral scenarios has also been 
downplayed so far by the CJEU. To do so, it pointed to the absence of suffi ciently 
detailed provisions to warrant a split conferral or to the objective or context of the 
agreement which could justify a full conferral of competence. 
 The question is what will be the outcome if such a reasoning is no longer con-
vincingly possible. Could one at all envisage mixed legal bases combining full, split 
and/or crippled conferral ? So far, the CJEU has managed to steer away from this 
thorny issue but it is bound to arise in this diffi cult post-Lisbon setting — it is only 
a matter of time. 
 
 

